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ABSTRACT
Directors’ corporate networks have been the subject of several studies that explore their different 
consequences, such as resource collaboration, transmission of practices, financial decisions, reduc-
tion of uncertainty, control and management, the firm’s reputation and individual interests. However, 
there is still no consensus about what these interlocking directorates (IDs) really do for firms and in 
what direction current research is following. This study carried out an extensive review of the literatu-
re in 75 papers (from 1969 to 2018) focused on IDs research, and as a result proposes two categories 
and four subcategories related to companies’ outcomes. The study found that the biggest contribution 
to firms, focuses on the description of network structures and control and management results, re-
marking the difference between North America IDs research and other regions, while shedding light 
on what IDs do for firms. It also identified gaps in research such as dissemination, globalization and 
collusion that need to have more analysis. 
RESUMEN
Las redes de directores han sido objeto de muchos estudios que exploran sus consecuencias tales 
como la colaboración de recursos, transmisión de prácticas, decisiones financieras, reducción de la 
incertidumbre, control, reputación e intereses individuales. Sin embargo, aún no existe un consen-
so acerca de lo que estas redes de directorios realmente hacen para las empresas y el camino que 
sigue su investigación. Este estudio realizó una revisión extensa de 75 artículos (desde 1969 hasta 
2018) enfocados en estas redes y propone dos categorías y cuatro subcategorías de acuerdo a sus 
resultados para las empresas. Se encontró que la mayor contribución para las empresas se enfoca 
en la descripción de la estructura de la red y en los resultados de control, mostrando diferencia 
entre la investigación de Norteamérica y otras regiones, dando luz acerca de lo que hacen estas 
redes para las empresas. Se identificó también que los efectos de difusión, la globalización y la 
colusión requieren más atención.
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INTRODUCTION
Any individual or community is naturally embedded in social relations (Granovetter, 
1985). It is through these social relations that different types of ties between entities 
are created (Granovetter, 1973) and these connections can establish a way to relate 
not just individuals, but can create ties among groups as well, making it possible 
to manage a two mode relationship (Breiger, 1974). A network is represented by 
the entities (individuals or collectivities) and their corresponding connections 
(Granovetter, 1976).
From the standpoint of the Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) the resource is strongly indicated as a need of organizations for their survival 
and to achieve good performance. However, the simple presence of a network is not 
sufficient to ensure obtaining benefits from it. In order to get access to the benefits 
of a network, it is necessary to identify what kind of resources are available from it, 
and most importantly, take notice of strategic and valuable resources that are not 
available from the organization’s internal sources (Hitt, Ireland, Camp & Sexton, 
2001). The group of valuable resources that a firm could obtain from its network 
is called social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Parkhe, Wasserman & Ralston, 2006) 
and the organization must make proper use of this social capital according to the 
surrounding conditions of the business environment (Kwon & Adler, 2014).
According to Breiger (1974), a two-mode network is a structured configuration 
formed by individuals and communities both at the same time. Some of the main 
characteristics of this configuration, such as cohesiveness or connectivity, could 
possibly be framed with specific “Small World” properties (Travers & Milgram, 
1969) defined by the length between entities, meaning the distance from one 
point to another; and clustering level, that implies network transitivity (Conyon & 
Muldoon, 2006). Firms are collectivities, and they are related to each other through 
inter-organizational relationships such as their board of directors. A corporate 
network is created when boards of different companies establish connections 
between themselves through business relationships where many resources such 
as information, trust, knowledge or access to capital may be found. Different types 
of corporate networks were studied before such as ownership networks, equity or 
interlocking directorates. This study will focus on the literature review about the 
latter, following the research questions explained below. 
IDs occur when a director sits on more than two boards opening the availability 
of new resources for each firm (Haunschild & Beckman, 1988; Shipilov, Greve & 
Rowley, 2010) or the possibility of control and coordination between them (Boyd, 
1990; Mizruchi, 1996; Palmer, 1983; Salvaj, 2013; Salvaj & Lluch, 2014; Lluch, Salvaj 
& Barbero, 2014). Furthermore, the formation of an ID may be due to individual 
interests of the directors (Zajac, 1988) or a wide class influence against the logical 
business criteria (Useem, 1984).
The relevance of this study is to understand how IDs global research has been 
evolving, while finding outcome patterns across the firms evolution. This allows us 
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to contribute in answering Mizruchi’s question regarding what interlocks really do in 
(1996), while clearing new paths for future research that could complement current 
findings, while reinforcing concepts where the literature is scarce. Understanding 
how IDs research evolution and its effect on firms’ outcomes contributes to building 
a consensus on Mizruchi’s question in IDs literature, while finding out if IDs are or 
are not reinforcing managerial practices are explained.
Making a differentiation between IDs research evolution among certain 
regions such as in Latin America or other emerging markets’ groups with the rest 
of the world could prove interesting, as most studies aim to explain the effects 
and characteristics of IDs under an environment’s stable conditions such as 
those in The United States or in European countries (Lluch et al, 2014). However, 
Latin America has a completely different business environment, with weak 
and ineffective governments, small and inefficient non-profit organizations as 
well as many cultural problems for developing strategies (Jäger & Sathe, 2014), 
which forces organizations to prepare themselves by using different growth and 
survival initiatives for this complex and turbulent context, and under high levels of 
uncertainty (Vassolo, De Castro & Gomez-Mejia, 2011).
The focus of this paper proposes a categorization of IDs research according to 
the firms results in having a regional perspective. Accordingly, the study answers 
the following two research questions: (1) For the firms studied, what was the main 
business contribution of IDs global research? (2) What is missing for IDs global 
research evolution in the years ahead?
This literature review proposes to contribute to the existing body of corporate 
networks’ research and to maintain an open discussion of the characteristics, benefits 
and advantages in creating interlocking directorates for firms, as well as identifying 
how researchers can contribute to the future growth of this organizational field.
This paper is organized as follows: The second section describes the method 
used for selecting papers, and how the literature was categorized. The third section 
contains the main document where the literature is detailed according to its 
contribution to the firms. The fourth part aims to provide a discussion regarding 
six different metrics that highlight patterns of IDs research evolution. Finally, the 
fifth section summarizes the principal findings of the literature review, focuses on 
answering the two research questions previously mentioned and proposes new 
paths for future research.
METHODOLOGY
The study was conducted with an extensive review of 75 IDs research papers (from 
1969 to 2018), in order to identify and analyze their main findings, categorize them by 
their region of study and their contribution for companies. Out of the total sample, 
70 of the papers were empirical and 5 were conceptual with no associated region of 
study. Table 1 shows the composition of the sample by convenience, as pointed out 
in the 2017 Scimago Journal and Country Rank for scientific journals. 
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Table 1. Papers inside the sample according to their Journal Scimago Ranking 2017.
Journal Scimago Rank 2017 Papers % Accumulated
Q1 58 77%
Q2 4 83%
Q3 3 87%
Q4 2 89%
Non-ranked 8 100%
Total 75  
Source: Own.
According to Table 1, 83% of the papers in the sample are in journals ranked as 
Q2 and above. The sample includes 39 different scientific journals and 4 books, and 
this selection was focused on heterogeneity and prestige criteria. However, there are 
eight non-ranked papers in the sample that are book chapters, which were selected 
according to their relevance and novel contribution for their regions. Table 2 aims 
to show the distribution of the sample according to the decade of publication of the 
papers inside.
Table 2. Papers inside the sample according to their publication decade.
Publication decade Papers
1960s 1
1970s 1
1980s 9
1990s 10
2000s 17
2010s 37
Total 75
Source: Own.
With reference to Table 2, the paper selection for this review includes some 
research before 1980s, when IDs research was beginning, an important number 
for the 1980s period and a larger amount of papers for 1990s and later, in order to 
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properly establish trends of IDs research evolution. Specifically, the sample includes 
34 different periods between 1969 and 2018.
The main IDs literature contributions for firms are organized in this paper 
under two principal grouping concepts: (1) Description of structures (DS), and (2) 
Organizational outcomes (OO). Then, the study proposes four subcategories, two 
for each one of the previous concepts: (1.1) Formation and ties description (DS-FT) 
and (1.2) Comparative description (DS-C) both for DS concept; (2.1) Control and 
management outcomes (OO-CM) and (2.2) Financial outcomes (OO-F) both for 
OO concept. This categorization details the main findings and contributions of IDs 
papers for firms.
The DS concept refers to a general or detailed description of networks’ structures, 
characteristics of ties, actors’ role and position within the network, and the evolution 
of the structure. DS-FT category includes detailed information about the reasons 
for the formation of the IDS and how corporate ties are constructed, maintained 
or broken. The DS-C category aims to explore by comparative studies between 
corporate networks of two or more datasets, finding common patterns and relevant 
differences, which allow to explain, as well how corporate networks evolve and 
operate differently in several contexts, economic sectors or groups.
The OO concept is focused on revealing findings in IDs literature closely 
related to firms’ outcomes. Research has proposed that IDs are created following 
some specific business targets like acquiring resources or gaining influence 
and control over a counterpart firm. Therefore, it is expected then that a major 
trend of IDs research aim to facilitate those objectives for companies. The OO-
CM category refers to firms’ outcomes related to the capability to exert control, 
influence and management over other firms. It means that IDs creation solves 
monitoring and supervising activities inside the corporate network. On the other 
hand, OO-F category includes firms’ outcomes related to financial decisions 
or benefits such as M&A transactions, financial policies diffusion, financial 
performance, and takeovers decisions.
Finally, the study concludes with a discussion of the results and future 
trends for IDs global research using six metrics obtained from the dataset of 
papers reviewed: (1) total of IDs related publications of academic journals by 
year of release, (2) percentage of IDs related publications per region, (3) total 
of IDs related publications in North America, Latin America and Europe over 
time, (4) final year of the studies’ samples for IDs related publications over 
their years of publication, (5) IDs related publications according to their main 
findings and year of release, and (6) percentage of IDs related publications 
according to their contribution.
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IDS RESEARCH UNDER FIRMS’ OUTCOME PERSPECTIVE
(1) DESCRIPTION OF STRUCTURES (DS)
There are many different reasons behind the decision to interlock boards. Firms 
usually like to work together, so they look for cohesive business environments 
where collective goals would be enforced, trust would be developed, there 
would be less opportunistic spirit, and a flow of valuable and new information 
between organizations is facilitated (Lluch et al, 2014). According to such 
expectations, corporate network structures result as being diverse with regard 
to their configuration (Davis & Mizruchi, 1999; Mizruchi, Brewster Stearns & 
Marquis, 2006). The descriptive analysis of the characteristics and patterns found 
among their connections permit the disclosure of some of those reasons, or other 
important information about firms’ behavior or their strategies. 
(1.1) Formation and Ties Description (DS-FT)
In a review from the period of 1935 through1965, Dooley (1969) identified five 
reasons for the existence of IDs in a sample analysis of 200 non-financial and 50 
financial largest firms in the United States: (1) Size of the organization, the larger 
the firm, the higher the number of current interlocks, opposite to what Takes 
and Heemskerk (2016) found later; (2) Management control, referring to the 
intention of controlling another companies activities by creating IDs with them; 
(3) Financial interlocks, with two reasons for having them, - fulfilling the necessity 
of control over an indebted firm or having access to capital to ensure business 
activity continuity, as Davis and Mizruchi (1999) found in their study of how the 
role of banks evolved in the United States corporate network from 1982 to 1994, 
by changing their centrality degree in the structure; (4) Competition, even with 
the execution of Clayton Act of 1914 in the United States, there was evidence that 
many companies still had IDs with competitors’ firms in the same market, and 
(5) Local interest groups, where the most important issue is to keep the unity and 
integration of a strategic group of firms, relating one to another through shared 
directors (Dooley, 1969). Therefore, interlocks were created as mechanisms to deal 
with the uncertainty of the environment, making it possible for the organization to 
respond accordingly to the demands in context (Pfeffer, 1972).
Directorate interlocks are created to introduce into the firm new valuable resources 
from the environment; or to support an elite group or some wide class statements 
in order to maintain the corporate network integration or to follow individual or 
group’s interests (Richardson, 1987; Phan, Hoon Lee & Chi Lau, 2003). In addition to 
this, Zajac (1988) found that director’s decisions are driven by personal professional 
interests, following an individual advancement strategy. After Dooley (1969), a later 
review by Mizruchi (1996) posed the question: What do interlocks do?, exhibited five 
main determinants for the creation of interlocking directorates, some of them are 
focused on the firm’s outputs purposes and others just serve the directors’ interests. 
The first group considers the following determinants: (1) Collusion, also described 
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by Dooley (1969) as a competition factor, where two or more organizations create 
these corporate ties in order to obtain an illegal advantage and execute some bad 
practices in the market; (2) Co-optation and monitoring, again referred to by Dooley 
(1969) as Management Control, where firms join together through an interlock to 
share resources and decrease the level of uncertainty that they have to deal with or 
to gain control and supervision over another organization; and (3) Legitimacy, when 
the composition of the board, obtained by the formation of interlocking directorates, 
enhances the reliability of the firm in the business community. On the other hand, 
the second group of determinants is focused on the construction of corporate 
ties oriented to: (4) Director’s self-interests as career advancement, stated also by 
Zajac (1988), when a director is interested in the creation of an interlock just for the 
purpose to boost his professional career; and (5) Social cohesion, exhibited also 
by Dooley (1969) as local groups of similar interests and by Useem (1984) as the 
existence of an Inner Circle, a small group characterized by its power, influence and 
connectivity over most important political, economic and social actors in a country, 
where directors aim to maintain the affiliation with a corporate elite (Useem, 1980; 
Mizruchi, 1996). Regarding risk of collusion through the presence of IDs, Simmons 
(2011) found no evidence for the establishment of IDs between two competing 
firms, challenging the previous statements of Dooley (1969) and Mizruchi (1996). 
However, Simmons’s findings suggested the legality of IDs as time contingent, 
due to the convergence of the firms’ activities in a specific sector. A later study of 
David and Westerhuis (2014) stated that the main functions of corporate networks as 
being four: (1) access to financial capital, usually needed by organizations’ business 
transactions, (2) channels for information, serving as pipe-lines through which several 
resources flow (explained later in OO-CM category), (3) control over competition, in 
accordance with the local antitrust regulations and characteristics and, (4) enhance 
the reputation of firms, considering the professional background of shared directors 
and their prestige.
In addition to these findings, Zajac and Westphal (1996) found, over a sample 
of 491 large firms in the United States during the period 1985-1992, that the reason 
for creating an interlock obeys mostly to the CEO’s influence and interests, looking 
to maintain his or her intra-organizational power through the manipulation of 
inter-organizational interlocks, when the CEO’s decisions of who will be part of the 
board depends on the level of control that he or she wants to have over the firm. 
These are similar results to those of Geletkanycz, Boyd and Finkelstein (2001), who 
demonstrated how CEO external directorate linkages were related to his or her 
compensation. Similarly, Fracassi and Tate (2012) indicated that powerful CEOs 
tend to search among directors well connected with them in order to appoint these 
executives to integrate the board. The result of this manipulation of the board’s 
composition, through the creation of several IDs, is a weaker monitoring over the 
CEOs’ business decisions. IDs formation also could be a matter of public policy 
accomplishment or just to facilitate a specific transaction. According to Cárdenas 
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(2015), the corporate network elite in Latin America is a fragmented one, revealing 
that countries are mostly interested only in national business transactions rather 
than management control over the region. They prefer local rather than regional 
ties, thus stopping the emergence of a transnational corporate network. Silva, Majluf 
and Paredes (2006) found that Chilean interlocking directorates by 2000 seemed to 
be there just to ensure an expropriation process or to fulfill some legal requirement. 
Sometimes these common transactions or obligations can help the creation of IDs. 
According to Lluch et al (2014), there could be more than one mechanism for network 
cohesion when an interlocking directorate is created. In their study, at the beginning 
of the 1970s, Argentina presented a cohesive corporate network considering three 
major business mechanisms: (1) identity by ethnic condition, (2) family relationships 
and (3) relationships to a common government agent who was present in many 
boards, called syndic. Similarly, the presence and number of interlocks can define 
the boundaries of a business mechanism as well, such as business groups (Khanna & 
Rivkin, 2006), or family firms (Salvaj, Ferraro & Tapies, 2008).
Regarding the resilience of interlocks, a broken tie occurs when the common 
director between two firms disappears (Palmer, 1983). As was observed in a research 
study of over 1,131 firms in the United States during the period 1962-1964, the 
majority of IDs accidentally broken were not reconstituted again. Furthermore, 
Palmer, Friedland and Singh (1986) found that just directional ties are more likely to 
be reconstituted. So according to this analysis, not all broken ties will be renewed; 
it will depend on the firm’s intentions, requirements and strategic goals (Palmer, 
1983). These findings do not support some of the statements made by Dooley (1969) 
and Mizruchi (1996) who proposed management control and monitoring as reasons 
for establishing IDs, leading to the expectation of the reconstitution of a broken 
corporate tie as something natural, something that was not evidenced by the empirical 
research. Furthermore, those who are or will be the directors’ companions on the 
board might influence the formation and reconstitution of interlocks. According to 
Conyon and Muldoon (2006), major interlocked directors tend to sit on boards where 
there are other highly interlocked ones. A study of the elite corporate network of 
100 businesses, 109 nonprofit organizations and 98 government committees in the 
United States, demonstrated that nonprofit organizations, especially charities and 
foundations, seem to have a lower integration and central degrees than business and 
government sectors, where major firms are important actors and have high-profile 
directors on their boards (Moore, Sobieraj, Allen Whitt, Mayorova & Beaulieu, 2002).
Actors who participate inside the corporate network have a responsibility and a 
correct function, but their final behavior depends on the context and the period where 
they have to perform. So, the dynamic and flexible roles of these participants mostly 
depends on the external influences of the environment. In a study of 166 firms in the 
United States, Mizruchi and Bunting (1981) found that by 1904 the total number of 
interlocks related to a firm could be improved in order to reveal the firm’s influence 
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according to the strength and direction of the ties. Nevertheless, later, Palmer (1983) 
demonstrated in his research over the period 1962-1964, that it is not sufficient just 
to consider their direction in order to find the balance of influence between two 
interlocked firms. These two contradictory findings reinforce the idea of Mizruchi 
et al (2006), where the effects of social ties could vary across time. Later analysis 
had shown that this centrality measure is time contingent, because firms that were 
highly central in one period, can exhibit a different centrality with the passing of the 
years, according to the changes of the business environment or the organizations’ 
strategies (Davis & Mizruchi, 1999), such as what happened with the banks in the 
United States during the period of 1982-1994, which over time changed their role of 
high central actors in the corporate network, or the banks and financial institutions 
in Spain by 2003 (Salvaj & Ferraro, 2005) and in the United Kingdom (Schnyder & 
Wilson, 2014), demonstrating that corporate networks’ structures evolve alongside 
countries’ current form of capitalism.
According to Salvaj (2013), Chile maintained its corporate network structure from 
1969 to 2005, but the participants within this changed their roles many times. This 
network kept its cohesion through changes in the regulations of the government, the 
entry of multinational companies and the capital market development, but its actors 
played different roles. For instance, at the beginning of the period under analysis, 
banks were central participants with a high degree of intermediation centrality, but 
after the economic crisis of 1982 and the open market global phenomenon, banks 
left this role to local business groups and some multinational firms. Therefore, the 
Chilean corporate network is a good example of how a group of firms can have a 
high degree of global centrality, but a weak role as intermediates connectors within 
this network (Salvaj, 2013). Furthermore, Wilson, Buchnea and Tilba (2017), explained 
how the role of banks and new financial institutions was enforced over time, from 
1904 to 1976, increasing the density of business leaders networks. These cases prove 
the resilience of the structure for interlocking directorates, but finally, the value of 
the cohesiveness of a business network comes when firms’ decisions take different 
paths, some for responsible behavior and others for collusion or other bad practices 
in the market (Salvaj, 2013). Despite the time contingent volatility of this centrality 
measure, IDs network seems to have an intrinsic property to maintain the structural 
characteristics of its configuration. Because of that, any possible removal of the main 
central boards or highly connected directors from the network will not produce 
major modifications in its structure, proving its resilience to external changes of the 
corporate governance factors (Davis, Yoo & Baker, 2003; Naudet & Dubost, 2017). 
Chilean IDs network had to deal with major political and economic changes in the 
business environment from 1970 to 2010, but nonetheless, it remained resilient, 
demonstrating a high level of connectivity between state-owned firms and private 
business groups (Salvaj & Couyoumdjian, 2015), similar to the Dutch corporate 
network, which maintained its resilience from 1903 to 2008 and exhibited banks 
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as central actors over that time (Westerhuis, 2014), the same as The United States 
corporate network between 1962 and 1966 (Mariolis and Jones, 1982), or the Swiss 
corporate network that demonstrated cohesiveness from 1910 to 2010, banks being 
in a central position until 1980, when globalization effects reduced the importance 
of banks within the network and increased the number of outside directors on the 
boards (Ginalski, David & Mach, 2014; Buchnea, Tilba & Wilson, 2018). Furthermore, 
Carroll (2002) found that the Canadian corporate network was completely changed 
from 1976 to 1996 due to external factors in the environment like the trans-
nationalization of capital, deregulation of the financial sector and reforms in the 
corporate governance, all of these reasons associated with the globalization trend. 
In addition to this, the Argentinian corporate network from 1923 to 2000 drowned 
in a long-term social deconstruction process that progressively fragmented it, 
because of the effect of external and internal issues, where businesses were not 
connected, were unaware of the potential benefits from IDs and finally losing 
their capability for attracting resources (Salvaj & Lluch, 2014). Resilience of both 
types of corporate network structures, ownership or interlocking directors, had 
been tested and proven, as well as other particularities such as traditional ruling 
class elites. According to Buck (2018), the British ruling class elite endured despite 
globalization effects over the entire corporate network that represented a huge 
number of new outside directors on the local boards. Kogut and Walker (2001) 
emphasized the robustness of the German ownership network structure that 
allowed it to endure over time, despite the globalization effects on the country’s 
economic environment. In addition to this, German IDs network had also shown 
high connectivity and centrality degree in Europe (Cárdenas, 2015), as well as the 
Spanish IDs and ownership networks (Salvaj & Ferraro, 2005), both representing 
exceptions to Kogut’s (2012) statement about the unlikelihood that a country has 
both corporate networks with the “Small-World” properties. 
(1.2) Comparative Description (DS-C)
In a study of 1,733 firms in the United States, 2,236 firms in the United Kingdom 
and 2,354 Germany firms, Conyon and Muldoon (2006) found strong similarities 
between the corporate network structures of these three countries, according to their 
“Small-World” properties that were evaluated. To the contrary, Musacchio and Read 
(2007) did a comparative analysis using 1909 data of Mexico and Brazil corporate 
networks and found that corporate interlocks are more common in Mexico, where 
formal institutions are weak or inefficient and organizations have to support their 
growth on informal institutions like interlocking directorates, in order to have proper 
access to important resources for their new ventures or initiatives. On the other hand, 
the Brazilian corporate network appears to be more fragmented and this structure 
implies that firms do not have a strong necessity for these corporate ties, because 
the formal institutions in Brazil were facilitating access to capital and good market 
conditions for the business community. (Musacchio & Read, 2007).
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According to Windolf (2009), antitrust regulation had a fragmentation effect on 
the United States corporate network, causing its density reduction and weakening 
of banks. However, Germany’s corporate network density is not only higher than the 
United States’ is, but also banks had better centrality degree, and bankers a higher 
position on the boards. IDs enforced the cooperative German business environment 
but not the competitive one of the United States, thus facilitating German directors 
to have more social capital than their American counterparts.
According to Salvaj (2013) and Salvaj and Lluch (2014), by the 1960s Argentina 
and Chile, two countries with a similar type of capitalism, had largely different 
corporate network structures mainly because of two factors: (1) the country’s 
political and economic situation and (2) the ownership structures of firms involved 
in this business network. They found that Argentina’s corporate network structure 
was fragmented, but on the other hand, the Chilean network had shown a lot of 
cohesiveness between organizations. It seems that Argentinean firms trust less 
these board relationships than Chilean ones (Salvaj, 2013; Salvaj & Lluch, 2014). 
Moreover, Salvaj (2013) and, Salvaj and Lluch (2014) emphasized that a country 
with weak institutions such as Argentina in that period, did not put its trust on IDs 
as a substitute action to deal with that weakness. Furthermore, the professional 
backgrounds of the most-connected directors inside the corporate network are 
different for both countries. Argentinean well-connected directors tend to be 
lawyers, government officers and accountants, while for Chile these directors are 
mostly businessmen (Salvaj, 2013; Salvaj & Lluch, 2014). Lluch, Rinaldi, Salvaj and 
Vasta (2017) also found differences between the evolution of IDs corporate networks 
of Argentina and Italy, the latter being more cohesive, where banks changed their 
roles across time and had a strong professional network of syndics. On the other 
hand, Argentinian banks had shown an irrelevant presence in the corporate network. 
By the early 1970s, there was a change in the corporate network in Argentina where 
business groups acted as connectors in this network, establishing business ties 
with other dispersed firms through the creation of interlocking directorates (Lluch 
et al, 2014). These business groups’ behavior generated more cohesiveness inside 
the corporate network in Argentina and set a new role for these firm groups, but 
one thing remains equal, the most relevant linkers in the Argentinean corporate 
network during 1970-1972 are still professionals, technicians or syndics, but not 
businessmen (Lluch et al, 2014). Finally, Windolf and Beyer (1996) also found 
differences between two European countries, Germany and Britain. IDs in the 
German corporate network serves mostly to ownership interests, while Britain’s 
corporate network do not exhibited a particular configuration favoring any group.
Cárdenas (2016) found that by 2012, corporate networks in Latin America exhibited 
a different structural configuration. Business elites had more cohesion in Mexico 
and Brazil than in Chile and Peru. Generally, management in Latin America is not 
related to ownership, and there is less redundancy between ownership and directors 
networks, considering that this pattern appeared repeatedly some decades ago. The 
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explanation for this might be a globalization phenomenon, which introduced a high 
number of outside directors on boards, keeping banks in a central position such as 
in Peru. There is evidence of “Inner Circles” (Useem, 1984) found inside these four 
countries’ corporate networks. 
(2) ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES (OO)
The effects of IDs on a firms’ behavior differ over time, as a consequence of 
changing markets and professional techniques evolution, how firms adapt their 
decisions to this evolution and the volatility of the environmental conditions 
(Mizruchi et al, 2006).
(2.1) Control and Management Outcomes (OO-CM)
The presence of an interlock in the relationship between two firms is enough to know 
that their behavior will be affected by this corporate tie (Mizruchi, 1996). Some of 
the consequences of creating IDs are corporate control and network embeddedness. 
Corporate control ensures having an influence on the decision-making process 
in other firms or the capacity of monitoring their business activities and obtain 
critical information from them, considering also that the board’s control role may 
be segmented through an interlocking manipulation of the CEO, according to his or 
her personal motivations to attain power (Zajac & Westphal, 1996), obtaining better 
compensation levels (Geletkanycz et al, 2001) or to have less resistance to his or 
her business decisions from the board (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). Network-embedded 
refers to the effect of the firm’s social relations in their strategic business decisions 
(Granovetter, 1985), using the corporate network as a big scan of the environmental 
situation and consequently adapting its initiatives to such (Mizruchi, 1996). 
Interlocks act as reliable conduits for information and directors’ experiences, 
facilitating the diffusion and the adoption process of different institutional and 
managerial practices through the corporate network (Davis, 1991; Davis & Greve, 
1997; Shipilov et al, 2010; Shropshire, 2010; Cai, Dhaliwal, Kim & Pan, 2014; Mazzola, 
Perrone & Kamuriwo, 2016), but the likelihood of this transmission process depends 
on some specific director’s characteristics and other firm’s conditions, such as their 
number of interlocks and their position in the network (Shropshire, 2010). Copying 
practices does not occur blindly, but through a discrimination process according to 
the firms’ preferences and behavior (Davis & Greve, 1997). Davis (1991) explained 
how interlock network centrality degree was positively related to the firm’s adoption 
of poison pill practices, looking for the stability of the business elite members and 
protecting companies from attempts of hostile takeovers. However, huge firms were 
unlikely to adopt this managerial practice because their own size represented a 
sufficient barrier for such transactions. Poison pill managerial practice spreads more 
rapidly through IDs networks rather than ones of geographical proximity (Davis & 
Greve, 1997). The presence of director interlocks is related also to the diffusion of 
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quarterly earnings cessation guidance and disclosure policies (Cai et al, 2014) and 
to the improvement of corporate reporting (Ginesti, Sannino & Drago, 2017). On the 
other hand, IDs act not just as providers for diffusion of practices, but as constrainers 
as well, depending on the specific resource they are going to share. According to 
Ortiz-de-Mandojana, Aragón-Correa, Delgado-Ceballos and Ferrón-Vílchez (2012), 
financial firms and fossil fuel firms are not likely to adopt environmental strategies 
because of the effect of director interlocks.
IDs facilitate coordination between firms possibly conducting them 
to alliances and collusion practices as well (Mizruchi, 1996). An adequate 
discrimination of how to adopt and use those practices could overwhelm firms’ 
responsibility when confronting high uncertainty in their contexts or come 
from communist systems. Following Szalacha (2011), IDs conflict of interests 
would appear mostly in those environments, where firms tend to operate on the 
edge of formal/informal and legal/illegal practices, and emerging economies 
for instance. Regulatory environment, globalization, and general economic 
conditions can moderate the effects of IDs in such coalitions and make adoption 
processes. Buch-Hansen (2014), found little evidence of collusion practices in 
Europe, when these environmental factors are involved.
IDs represent an external source through which several resources flow, enabling 
monitoring, influencing, co-opting and collaborating activities among firms and their 
environment. In a study of 80 large firms in the United States in 1969, Pfeffer (1972) 
determined that a precise presence of interlocks according to the environmental 
needs was related to firms’ positive performance. The corporate network permits it to 
monitor and respond to uncertainty of market fluctuations, establishing relationships 
with banks via interlocking directorates (Burt, 1980). A later research study of board 
composition and number of interlocks over a sample of 147 companies from different 
industries in the United States, had shown that firms tend to increase the number 
of their interlocking directorates and reduce the size of their boards to deal with 
environmental uncertainty and resources scarcity. Then, these firms concentrated on 
maintaining directors with a high level of corporate linkages (Boyd, 1990). In addition 
to this, Bucheli, Salvaj and Kim (2018) maintain that Chilean business groups dealt 
with the transition period in the economic environment by establishing IDs between 
them, not abandoning their corporate ties once institutional voids were addressed. 
To the contrary, a study of 3,745 manufacturing firms in the United States during the 
period 2001–2009, had demonstrated that IDs do not reduce the uncertainty that a 
firm has to deal with, but they are capable of enhancing firm performance and bring 
positive effects to it under the presence of high levels of uncertainty in the business 
environment (Martin, Gözübüyük & Becerra, 2015). The level of uncertainty has a 
moderating role in the relationship between the position of these executive ties inside 
the corporate network and the organization’s performance. So, uncertainty creates the 
necessary conditions to obtain the benefits of having IDs in the organization, not as a 
reason for creating them. Similarly, Larcker, So and Wang (2013) previously found that 
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well-connected boards will improve organizational performance especially in firms 
which are facing adverse situations. These findings are consistent with Beckman, 
Haunschild and Phillips (2004) research where firms that were facing individually 
specific uncertainty did not look to expand their corporate network structure, but 
to increase their interlocks with their current corporate network partners. The need 
of resources could lead organizations to the establishment of IDs in order to create 
synergies with other firms with complementary benefits. Bennett (2013), found banks 
and Chambers strongly connected by interlocked boards over the corporate network, 
sharing different resources they mutually expected.
Another way to deal with and exert monitoring action over business 
environment is to seek for influence in the political decision-making process of 
the organizations. According to Mizruchi and Koenig (1991), the presence of IDs 
between larger firms within a concentrated industry is related to similar political 
decisions, where both firms support and make economic contributions to the same 
candidates. Corporate elite political cohesion is strongly related to the action 
of IDs in the corporate network, more than members of the same industry or 
geographical proximity factors (Burris, 2005).
(2.2) Financial outcomes (OO-F)
There are two types of inter-organizational directorship interlocks, one focused 
on fulfilling its inter-organizational objectives and another one committed to an 
integration function (Richardson, 1987). Considering this, in the specific relationship 
between a non-financial firm and a financial one, the non-financial corporation obtained 
positive effects on its profit performance as a result of the replacement of broken ties 
in its corporate network, and following its inter-organizational functions as well. The 
second type of interlocks, according to Richardson (1987), are unrelated to firm profit 
performance. Furthermore, an analysis of a sample of 191 joint-stock firms in Singapore 
at the end of 1997 also exhibited these two types of corporate networks, a group of 
directors who searched for valuable resources and another elite group who sought to 
maintain their wide class influence in the business community (Useem, 1984), and how 
these two interlock trends are related to firm performance (Phan et al, 2003). According 
to this research, those directors who want to attain power and influence through their 
corporate relationship tend to create interlocking directorates in the intra-industry 
range, having no effect at all on firm performance and also a negative collusion risk; 
while boards who are interested in capturing strategic resources for the firm mostly 
rely on inter-industry interlocks, generating a positive impact on organizational results. 
This is partially consistent with Larcker et al (2013) findings that well-connected boards 
have positive results on the firm’s financial performance. Pombo and Gutiérrez (2011) 
showed similar findings in a study of Latin America of 335 Colombian firms, where the 
presence of outside directors and the number of interlocks were strongly related to the 
firms’ financial performance.
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Interlocking directorates are also presented as mechanisms related to some 
specific financial results such as periodical company financial reports. According to 
Chiu, Hong Teoh and Tian (2013) in their study of 118 firms in the United States 
during the period 1997-2001, they found that the social contagion effect which flows 
through a corporate network makes it possible that a non-manipulative firm changes 
into one because of the presence on its board of a shared director from a manipulative 
earnings-oriented organization. As opposed to this, a non-manipulative firm that 
does not have any interlock with a manipulative earnings-oriented one is less likely 
to acquire this bad practice (Chiu et al, 2013). Mizruchi et al (2006) demonstrated 
that the effect of corporate ties on the firms’ financial behavior is historically 
contingent. Firms have shown a less progressive use of IDs in financial decisions as 
a consequence of the professionalization of financial activity, the internalization of it 
and the changes in the business environment (Mizruchi et al, 2006). These findings 
are complementary with Mizruchi and Brewster Stearns (1988) findings that firms 
tend to seek to have a financial representative on their board when they face solving 
deficiencies or an increase of their long-term debt, and this decision will allow 
them to have access to sources of capital, increasing their likelihood of borrowing 
from financial institutions (Mizruchi & Brewster Stearns, 1994). In addition to this, 
some factors of the economic environment such as demand for capital or phases 
of expansion in the business cycle are also positively related to making financial 
arrangements. Additionally, in response to the conditions of the environment, such 
as times of economic crisis, financial institutions are likely to demand their presence 
on non-financial boards in order to be able to monitor their investments (Mizruchi & 
Brewster Stearns, 1988). 
Corporate network of IDs facilitates the diffusion of financial practices or the 
directors’ experiences, which permit taking financial-related decisions. In the 1981-
1990 period in 327 medium and large firms and their interlocked business community 
in the United States, Haunschild and Beckman (1988) found that IDs are useful sources 
of information for a firm’s acquisitions decisions when the focal organization does 
not have any other substitute source for this financial means. Therefore, according 
to this, the importance of interlocks as financial information enablers depends on 
which other sources of information are available for access. Fracassi and Tate (2012) 
also found firms that had directors with external ties to the CEO that usually decided 
on more acquisitions, but these decisions finally destroyed the firm’s value. Moreover, 
Cai and Sevilir (2012) proved that M&A transactions between interlocked firms have 
different consequences for the acquirer and the target. They found that these M&A 
transactions between first-degree connected boards, when acquirer and target have a 
shared director sitting on both boards, tend to favor the acquirer announcing higher 
obtainable returns, because of the asymmetric information that it has in the face of 
other bidders and the possibility of bargaining for a lower price, considering also that 
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costs derived from banks or advisors will be less. Quite the opposite occurs in M&A 
transactions among second-degree connected boards, when both firms have the 
same director who sits on a third board, and where this kind of connectivity seems to 
favor the value created by the whole transaction (Cai & Sevilir, 2012). Benefits from 
financial decisions that come from IDs presence, depend on the type of interlock 
and the firms’ connectivity level in the network, and finding directors corporate 
ties as reliable sources of critical information (Zona, Gomez-Mejia & Withers, 2018). 
Private equity-trade transactions are more likely to occur between firms interlocked 
by their boards, because directors use their knowledge and past experiences in those 
transactions to incentive or enhance similar ones (Stuart & Yim, 2010), in the same 
way that happens with decisions about auditors choice and fees in an interlocked firm 
(Johansen & Pettersson, 2013), synchronous stock price between Chilean corporate 
network firms (Khanna & Thomas, 2009) and similar financial policies such as capital 
investment, R&D, cash reserves and interest coverage ratio (Fracassi, 2016). Finally, 
corporate elites embedded in social networks allow an imitation process between 
the participants, reflecting the power of interlocking directorates in the economic 
and strategic decisions of the largest firms and business groups.
DISCUSSION
The discussion of the literature review results is focused on answering the two 
initial research questions of this manuscript, the first about the main management 
contribution for firms of IDs global studies, and the second one about the next 
steps for IDs research, according to its current progression and its opportunities or 
limitations beyond this study.
According to Figure 1, there is a concentration of IDs research released since 2006 
and ahead, exhibiting a prominent number of papers in 2014. This can be the result of 
a renewed interest about board management because of the Enron, WorldCom and 
Tyco economic frauds (2001) and its impact in the global business community, and 
then Olympus (2011), Barclays (2012) and Petrobras (2014), which keep the attention 
on companies’ ownership and boards (CNN, 2015).
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Figure 1. Total of IDs related publications in academic journals by year of release.  
Own elaboration.
1
0
2
3
4
5
6
19
69
19
72
19
80
19
81
19
82
 1
98
3
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
90
19
91
19
94
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
Not only corporate scandals increased the interest for IDs research, but new 
comparative trends and methodologies for research as well. In addition to this, new 
antitrust legislation and a set of corporate governance regulations in countries 
boosted the development of this organizational field as well. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of papers per region of study. The amount of 37 
papers was found which focused on the North American region that represents more 
than 50% of the sample. Europe is in the second place with 15 studies representing 
22% of the total sample. Latin America appears with 12 papers, that represents 17% of 
the total. Finally, the rest of the sample is distributed between Asia and some mixed 
research between North America and Europe, and Latin America and Europe.
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Figure 2. Percentage of IDs related publications per region. Own elaboration.
IDs literature requires a balance between regions of study. As there are many 
papers related to North America IDs corporate networks, it is necessary to explore 
more related to Europe, Latin America, Asia and the African regions. Since 1914, The 
United States corporate governance rules changed because of antitrust regulation, 
which represented a tipping point in the evolution of the business environment 
for firms. More important, is the finding of a lack of cross-continental research 
about interlocking directorates. In this review, there are several comparative 
studies between countries within the same region. However, the manuscript only 
identified three papers with data from different regions, North America and Europe, 
and Latin America and Europe. Taking into account that some world-scale events 
such as globalization, commodities commerce and economic crisis actually have a 
global impact, it seems strongly relevant to expand IDs literature with these cross 
continental comparative studies, looking at the effects on corporate networks at 
different regional levels.
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Figure 3 demonstrates the extent IDs literature focused on North America over time and the 
interest in Europe since 1996, and recently Latin America from 2006.
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Figure 3. Total of IDs related publications in North America, Latin America and Europe over time. Own 
elaboration.
Considering that two conceptual studies of director interlocks in the sample 
come from 1996 (Mizruchi) and 1980 (Useem), it is interesting how empirical studies 
are constructed on traditional American perspectives. As a global phenomenon, IDs 
research has to keep revisiting previous concepts of corporate networks and director 
interlocks in order to fill in the gaps, due to the progress of management sciences 
and how empirical studies are opening new paths and questions for future research. 
Conceptual research of business elites interlocks is urgent in Latin America, 
considering the huge differences with other regions such as the turbulent business 
environment of emerging economies (Vassolo et al, 2011) and the variations of 
capitalism which those countries have crafted (Schneider, 2013). 
IDs global research is following an appropriate tendency in the use of data for 
empirical studies. According to Figure 4, the tendency of the final year in the studies’ 
samples used in every empirical IDs research is positively related to the year of 
publication in almost all the cases. In just two cases, the data used was particularly 
older, as the study observes in the 1981 and 2007 papers. 
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Figure 4. Final year of the studies’ samples of IDs related publications over their years of 
publication. Own elaboration.
This finding is encouraging in terms of data availability for IDs research. 
Scholars have to ensure the recompilation of data and elaboration of data sets that 
permits proper empirical research for the next years. This also confirms that IDs 
global research is using data progressively, and capturing its evolution properly.
According to the contribution for firms of IDs publications, this study found 
a moderate concentration of DS related papers since 1960s until 1990s and 
then, a growing interest in OO related publications. This distribution of papers’ 
contributions over time can be observed in Figure 5, and this paper argues two 
reasons to explain it: (1) a better understanding of IDs phenomenon as a first 
natural step; and (2) the assistance of information technology in the networks 
field of research, which allow the appearance of more comparative and detailed 
descriptive papers.
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Figure 5. IDs related publications according to their main findings and year of release. 
Own elaboration.
It seems that following these findings IDs research has found the balance between 
these two major trends of description (DS) and outcomes (OO). The equilibrium over 
quantity and release of publications for each contribution leads one to think that 
both support each other in order to continue their growth. Descriptive analysis is the 
basis for an outcome explanation, but it probably does not work in the opposite way. 
Few cases for DS-OO papers push us to consider that just the contribution papers 
of the outcomes could be using other sources for basic elements of DS, probably 
without considering the local context and other important specific characteristics of 
ties in the corporate network.
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Figure 6 displays the IDs publications contribution share over the total of papers 
analyzed, considering there are eight papers, 10.7% of the sample, with more than one of 
these four possible contributions, according to the proposed categorization in this study.
DS-FT
45%
DS-C
7%
OO-CM
28%
OO-F
20%
Figure 6. Percentage of IDs related publications according to their contribution. Own 
elaboration.
The main contribution seems to be a detailed description of structures and how 
ties operate inside corporate networks, and the second one is related to organizational 
outcomes, specifically control and management outcomes for firms. So, the current state 
of IDs research can be summarized as the need of a descriptive analysis of corporate 
networks structures in order to understand how firms can deal with the uncertainty 
in the environment, monitoring others and acquiring resources. Nevertheless, it is 
important to strengthen research focused on the contribution of financial outcomes, 
because of one of the main reasons of boards’ interlocks existence, the separation of 
ownership and control, delivering value to stakeholders and solving agency problems 
as well. Finally, it is important to increase the comparative studies about IDs because 
the effects of director interlocks are strongly related to changes due to external 
reasons. Additionally, the comparative analysis of connected corporate elites between 
countries and regions will permit enhancement of the understanding of the role in 
context of each corporate network configuration, and the how the role of actors could 
vary depending on time periods and firms requirements.
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a new two-category structure followed by a four sub-category 
level for the organization of IDs literature of a sample of papers from 1969 to 2018, 
according to its main findings as a contribution for the application of practices in 
firms. In addition to this, the study also proposes six different metrics to discuss the 
results while answering the two research questions provided in the first part.
IDs literature’s most important contribution for firms is related to the description 
of the corporate network structures, analyzing the reasons for the creation of these 
interlocks and describing business elites ties characteristics and particularities. Having 
a proper description of the nature of director ties’, firms could be able to understand 
how their connections with other firms are affecting their decision-making processes 
and, how the constraints and opportunities in the business environment are related 
to their level of connectivity inside the corporate community. This finding suggests 
that the biggest IDs research contribution for firms has remained at a descriptive and 
theoretical level, perhaps unreachable in the practitioners’ field unless appropriate 
literature channels for management application could be properly driven. 
Additionally, it seems that current IDs research is closely related to organizational 
behavior but focused on control and management outcomes, rather than financial 
ones. IDs research tends to benefit organizational outcomes when these corporate 
relationships follow the Resource Dependence Theory statements or the growth 
objectives of inter and intra-industry business communities. On the contrary, when 
these director ties aim to preserve the status of an elite group or are oriented to 
fulfill integration and cohesion goals, they do not have any effect on organization 
performance. Ironically, one of the main reasons for collaborative and cooperative 
action through director interlocks is the improvement of capabilities of resources 
attraction, which would benefit financial performance. However, the results of this 
study suggest that IDs research have been focused on explaining the structures first 
and many other additional facts found for financial outcomes.
IDs research exhibited multiple regional gaps, mainly because this organizational 
field matured first in North America and later in Latin America and Europe. In fact, 
director interlocks originally came from the type of competitive capitalism which reigns 
over the United States. However, every region has its own business particularities, 
regulations and laws trying to shape the way IDs corporate networks grow. Latin 
America, for instance, has its own opportunities and risks of managing the distance 
between control and ownership inside organizations, because of the high presence 
of family firms, informal markets and institutional voids. So, each country and region 
have similarities and differences, making the reinforcement of IDs comparative studies 
more important. IDs research focused on Latin America has had a major presence 
since the 2000s, oriented mostly to comparative and structural studies, and Europe has 
shown a conservative role using data for this research trend. The Latin America region 
was a latest adopter of capitalism as an economic system, and its capitalism is different 
from other regions, limiting its capacity for innovation, making added value products, 
and growth (Schneider, 2013). The incipient participation of the Latin American 
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region in IDs global research dialogue shows a growing interest of scholars from that 
region focused on the structure, characteristics and evolution of their corporate elite 
networks. Further, it urges more cross continental research that would strengthen the 
organizational field, capture the global effects of major scale events such as financial 
crisis and globalization, and finally, find evidence about how IDs are actually related to 
their business environments. 
The revisiting of main concepts of Interlocking Directorates Theory seems 
necessary to have robust evidence about how IDs have been evolving over time, 
according to their extended application in management sciences. Key conceptual 
papers come from a North America business environment considering a competitive 
capitalism that is different from cooperative capitalism in Europe and hierarchical 
capitalism in Latin America (Schneider, 2013), and specific antitrust regulations which 
are poorly developed or absent in other regions. In addition to this, data sets used for 
IDs research are evolving progressively according to the years of publication of the 
studies. This is an encouraging finding, which provide useful information about the 
evolution of IDs research and permits the proposal for new paths for future research.
Some of the limitations for the present study may actually present new avenues 
for future development of IDs global research. This manuscript considers 75 
papers as an initial revisit of this controversial and unanswered question about 
what interlocks really do, building on Mizruchi’s (1996) unfinished debate. It seems 
necessary then to extend the number of papers in order to reinforce the global view 
of this phenomenon and to identify new gaps in the literature. Following the theory, 
IDs represent reliable conduits for the transmission of practices. However, this 
study misses a categorization regarding the properties and description of diffusion 
processes in order to separate the positive practices from negative ones. Therefore, 
it would be interesting in the future to research how specific patterns of the diffusion 
process involves the presence of IDs, and what their impact on firms’ outcomes is. Big 
historical or economic events are not considered under the perspective of this study, 
but previous research has demonstrated the importance of established IDs corporate 
network configuration into a timeline of big scale events. Globalization for example, 
is changing the way IDs are connected to firms’ behavior and performance. It will be 
relevant for future research on globalization to focus on the effects of the evolving 
configuration of elites networks. Moreover, the latest research contradicts traditional 
statements such as those related to collusion practice as a consequence of IDs 
presence in the corporate network, so further empirical research is needed related to 
collusive activities through director interlocks. This will permit management science 
to declare those as a potential IDs risk or just as a timely contingent pattern.
Finally, IDs global research is relevant in understanding firms’ decisions, behavior 
and performance; but director interlocks creation depends on external influences in 
the business environment, internal forces of individual interests, and the objectives 
of a hidden business agenda of an elite class trying to enforce its cohesion. Because 
of these factors, IDs research has to be developed as a globally affected, locally 
contextual and timely contingent effort.
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